

Message Text

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15

ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00 EUR-12 SAJ-01 BIB-01

ACDA-05 EB-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-11 SAM-01

AGR-05 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 STR-04 CU-02 /120 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 043151

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, PINT, PFOR

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AT THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR REPORT NO. 330, DATED
FEBRUARY 20, 1976, AND ENTITLED AS ABOVE.

2. BEGIN TEXT

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3. ON FEBRUARY 24, MORE THAN 5,000 DELEGATES WILL GATHER
IN THE KREMLIN PALACE OF CONGRESSES TO HEAR BREZHNEV POINT
WITH PRIDE TO THE ACHIEVEMENTS WROUGHT UNDER HIS AEGIS
SINCE THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS FIVE YEARS AGO AND KOSYGIN

LAY OUT PLANS FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE 25TH CONGRESS WILL PROVE TO BE A DULL AFFAIR. THE KREMLIN, HOWEVER, WILL PROCLAIM THAT DRAMATIC, NEW, COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVES WERE LAUNCHED, THAT THEY GENERATED EVER GREATER LABOR ENTHUSIASM AT HOME, AND THAT THEIR SCIENTIFIC MERITS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED, HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY, BY THE RULING CIRCLES IN THE IMPERIALIST WEST.

4. IT WILL BE SURPRISING IF THE 25TH CONGRESS PRODUCES DRASTIC POLICY OR PERSONNEL SHIFTS, OR EVEN REVEALS

MUCH SERIOUS PRESSURE FOR CHANGE IN THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE KREMLIN. IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE IS ALTERED, IT WILL BE REFORMULATED IN A SOMEWHAT MORE CONSERVATIVE VEIN AND THAT ONLY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE MADE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE RULING BODIES.

5. FOREIGN POLICY: FOREIGN POLICY STANDS TO RATE LESS ATTENTION THAN IT DID AT THE ONSET OF THE DETENTE ERA. IT WOULD BE SURPRISING IF US-SOVIET RELATIONS TOOK PRIMACY, EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF LAUDING THE WISDOM OF THE PARTY'S POLICIES, WHICH HAVE ACHIEVED 25 YEARS OF PEACE FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

6. NEVERTHELESS, BREZHNEV WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY PRESENT A POSITIVE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION THUS FAR OF HIS 1971 "PEACE PROGRAM." DETENTE, ESPECIALLY AS EXPRESSED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF CSCE, IS LIKELY TO BE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF HIS ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT. GIVEN THE EFFORTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE TO DEFUSE CHARGES OF VIOLATING BASKET III, BREZHNEV IS EXPECTED TO DEFEND SOVIET COMPLIANCE VIGOROUSLY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL CRITICIZE WESTERN FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE DOCUMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY, ESPECIALLY ITS BASKET II ECONOMIC PROVISIONS. CONFIDENTIAL

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HE CAN BE EXPECTED AT LEAST TO REPEAT, IF NOT ELABORATE SOMEWHAT, HIS CALL AT THE POLISH CONGRESS FOR FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCES ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS ENVIRONMENT.

7. IN GENERAL TERMS, BREZHNEV PROBABLY WILL REAFFIRM DETENTE POLICIES IN PRINCIPLE BUT PLACE SOMEWHAT LESS EMPHASIS ON THE BENEFITS TO BE ACCRUED FROM IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE CAPITALIST WORLD, PARTICULARLY THE US. (MENTION OF THE EXTENT OF GRAIN IMPORTS IS UNLIKELY.) THE MERITS OF SALT II WILL BE PROCLAIMED, AS WILL SOVIET DEDICATION TO ITS CONCEPT OF MBFR. ANY INCLINATION TO SPEAK MORE CRITICALLY OF THE US AND THE WEST IN GENERAL WILL BE TEMPERED BY THE CONTINUING FRICTION WITH PEKING.

8. VERBIAGE ON CHINA WILL, IN TURN, BE SOMEWHAT LESS CRITICAL THAN THE KREMLIN MIGHT OTHERWISE PREFER, GIVEN THE SEEMING INSTABILITY OF THE CURRENT PEKING LEADERSHIP SCENE. A RENEWED CALL FOR NORMALIZATION OF STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS IS TO BE EXPECTED, ALONG WITH A REPEAT CALL FOR A STILL UNDEFINED ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONFERENCE.

9. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTY'S ROLE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY FORCES WILL GARNER EQUAL, IF NOT GREATER, EMPHASIS. THE USSR'S INCREASED CONTRIBUTION TO "LIBERATION" AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE IN ANGOLA AND VIETNAM, WILL CERTAINLY BE TOUTED.

10. RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE MENTIONED IN MORE TEMPERED TERMS THAN IN THE PAST. PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND GREECE WILL BE NOTED AS EXAMPLES OF PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, BUT ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ELABORATED UPON. THE RECALCITRANCE OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IS LIKELY TO BE GLOSSED OVER IN THE CONTEXT OF A RENEWED CALL FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE NEED TO ESTABLISH AND FOLLOW A COMMON LINE.

11. AS CONCOMITANT TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST, STRESS WILL BE PUT ON THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS IN EASTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA, BUT WITH MORE EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION THAN WAS EVIDENT IN 1971.

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12. DOMESTIC POLICY: DOMESTIC CONCERNS WILL DOMINATE THE PROCEEDINGS, ESPECIALLY IN KOSYGIN'S PRESENTATION ON THE 10TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND IN THE SO-CALLED DEBATES ON HIS AND BREZHNEV'S REPORTS. EXPECTED HIGHLIGHTS WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A)--HEAVY INDUSTRY AND DEFENSE WILL CONTINUE TO GET PRIORITY IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES--CLOAKED, HOWEVER, IN RHETORIC PROCLAIMING THE PARTY'S CONTINUING DEVOTION TO THE WELFARE OF THE SOVIET MAN IN THE STREET. AN APOLOGETIC NOTE MAY BE STRUCK ABOUT REDUCED RATES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BUT IT WILL BE CAST IN TERMS OF "HISTORIC OPTIMISM" BASED ON ATTAINMENTS SINCE, SAY, WORLD WAR II.

(B)--THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY, NOT JUST THE QUANTITY, OF SOVIET PRODUCTION WILL BE EMPHASIZED, AS WILL INCREASED LABOR AND CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY. DESPITE THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC REFORM, LITTLE IS EXPECTED TO BE MENTIONED OTHER THAN A REAFFIRMATION OF THE "ASSOCIATION" MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION, AND THE AGRICULTURAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES IN

AGRICULTURE. THE EXTANT STRUCTURE OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE ECONOMY WILL BE PRESERVED, INCLUDING THE COLLECTIVE-STATE FARM SYSTEM.

(C)--THE MILITARY/SECURITY APPARATUS WILL BE GIVEN ITS DUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTINUING DANGER POSED BY THE "WOUNDED" IMPERIALIST FORCES. PLEDGES TO KEEP THEM AT THE PROPER LEVEL MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS STRIDENT, HOWEVER, THAN IN THE PAST.

(D)--THE CONSUMER WILL GET MORE LIP SERVICE BUT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE BENEFIT. ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO ALLAY DISSATISFACTION BY STRESSING THE UNEMPLOYMENT, LABOR UNREST, ETC., NOW RAMPANT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD.

(E)--A STRICTER "IDEOLOGICAL TONE" PROBABLY WILL BE SET BY CALLS FOR MORE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINE TO OVERCOME WHAT APPEARS TO BE A WIDENING POPULAR MALAISE
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STEMMING IN PART FROM THE GROWING REALIZATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL DISASTER. THIS MAY WELL TAKE THE LINE OF HEIGHTENED CRITICISM OF DISSENT, CAST IN TERMS OF ANTI-REVISIONIST AND NATIONALIST MANIFESTATIONS.

13. POSSIBLE PERSONNEL CHANGES: IF THE POLITBURO AND/OR SECRETARIAT RANKS ARE REORDERED, POSTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO ENSURE CONTINUED BALANCE AMONG DIVERSE INTERESTS RATHER THAN BE ALLOWED TO ACCRUE TO A SINGLE POWER GROUP.

14. POSSIBLE CHANGES INCLUDE:

(A)--THE BEST BET TO LOSE HIS POLITBURO SEAT IS 77-YEAR-OLD PELSHE.

(B)--POLYANSKIY, TOO, COULD WELL BE DROPPED, BUT HIS QUIET DEPARTURE IS MORE LIKELY THAN HIS BEING MADE THE PUBLIC SCAPEGOAT FOR THE HARVEST.

(C)--MINISTER OF CULTURE DEMICHEV MAY LOSE HIS CANDIDATE MEMBERSHIP ON THE POLITBURO; IN ANY EVENT, A NEW OVERSEER OF CULTURE IN THE SECRETARIAT IS EXPECTED TO BE NAMED.

(D)--POSSIBLE PROMOTIONS TO FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO INCLUDE RSFSR PREMIER SOLOMENTSEV AND LENINGRAD PARTY BOSS ROMANOV.

(E)--ROMANOV, AND BREZHNEV'S UKRAINIAN PROTEGE, SHCHERBITSKIY, MAY ALSO RECEIVE NEW ASSIGNMENTS IN MOSCOW, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE CONSIDERED AS EVENTUAL CANDIDATES FOR BREZHNEV'S MANTLE.

15. POSSIBLE SURPRISES: WHILE OTHER CHANGES SEEM
UNLIKELY, SURPRISES ARE, OF COURSE, ALWAYS POSSIBLE.
THEY MIGHT INCLUDE:

(A)--BREZHNEV'S ELEVATION TO A NEW POST OF PARTY CHAIR-
MAN; KIRILENKO'S APPOINTMENT AS FIRST SECRETARY, OR THE
MAIN PARTY ADMINISTRATOR, AS WAS RUMORED IN 1975; OR ANY
VARIATION ON THAT THEME: BREZHNEV TAKING THE "PRESIDENCY"
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FROM PODGORNYY; THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN-PODGORNYY-SUSLOV
QUADRIGA MOVING TO "EMERITUS" STATUS;

(B)--PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS OVER THE 1975 HARVEST SO BITTER
AS TO LEAD NOT ONLY TO POLYANSKIY'S DEPARTURE BUT THAT OF
PARTY SECRETARY KULAKOV AS WELL; IF SO, THEN PROPOSALS
MIGHT BE REVIVED TO ESTABLISH THE LINK SYSTEM IN COLLEC-
TIVE FARMS AND NEW CONCESSIONS MADE TO PRIVATE PLOT
WORKERS;

(C)--SOLID, NEGOTIABLE PROPOSALS ON THE ARMS CONTROL
FRONT;

(D)--A MORE AGGRESSIVE IDEOLOGICAL LINE VIS-A-VIS NON-
RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES, DEMANDING SOVIET-STYLE
ORTHODOXY OR EXCOMMUNICATION;

(E)--HEIGHTENED ANTI-CHINESE MILITANCY, OR ITS CONVERSE,
SERIOUS OVERTURES FOR SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT; AND

(F)--SURFACING OF A 15-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN AS CALLED
FOR BY BREZHNEV IN THE PAST, OR EVEN LESS PROBABLE, A
DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO REPLACE THE 1936 VERSION ONCE
PROCLAIMED AS THE STALIN CONSTITUTION.

FINALLY, IN VIEW OF PRAVDA'S FEBRUARY 14 LEAD
EDITORIAL ON THE 20TH CPSU CONGRESS, WHICH CRITICIZED
THE STALIN CULT, IT WOULD BE ASTONISHING TO SEE STALIN
REUNITED WITH LENIN IN THE RED SQUARE MAUSOLEUM. INGERSOLL

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